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The tremendous expansion of the Chinese economy since the turn of the century, especially in terms 
of its external dynamics, is of world-scale significance. It seems to justify the quest for appropriate 
conceptions of China‟s systematic impact on late development worldwide. A large number of 
scholarly studies have coalesced to analyse two crucial aspects of the impact, namely: impact on the 
performance of industrialization and the condition of labour in the developing world. This paper seeks 
to critically appraise and reinterpret the existing studies. The appraisal is not so much a critique but 
rather an attempt to appropriately position the studies in the systematic context. It is submitted that the 
existing studies‟ focus on market competition, as the main form through which China‟s impact 
manifests, needs to be complemented and underpinned by the more fundamental consideration on 
productive investment. In the direction of constructing a systematic conception, it is further submitted 
that the China impact can potentially serve as a countervailing force against the prevailing dynamics 
of the world economy under neoliberal globalization – i.e., the rising predominance of speculative 
finance that tends to crowd out productive investment, thereby hampering industrialization and 
worsening labour condition in the developing world. 







The tremendous expansion of the Chinese economy since the turn of the century is of world-scale 
significance. Between 2000 and 2018, China accounted for almost a quarter of the increase in world 
economic output, and almost a half of the increase in all developing (i.e., low- and middle-income) 
economies. In the meantime, China accounted for 35% of the increase in industrial value-added of the 
world and 56% in all developing economies. From 2000 to 2017, China „raised‟, in the accounting 
sense, the average annual growth of the real wage rates of the world from 1.3% to 2.3%. Regarding 
international economic activities, by the 2010s, China became the biggest merchandise-trading 
economy in the world as well as a major supplier and recipient of international investment. It has also 
initiated a range of policy programmes, most famously the Belt-and-Road Initiative, aimed at 
reshaping the economic landscapes of the world.1 
These developments have given rise to widespread concerns over the nature of the Chinese 
economy and its interaction with the rest of the world. Given the vastness of the scales, they seem to 
justify the quest for appropriate conceptions of China‟s systematic impact on world development. By 
systematic impact it refers to the space for development that has been created and acquired by China, 
vis-à-vis the space in the world as a whole. In the context of global economic stagnation, the 
immediate concern over development space can be pinned down as the sharing of the world total of 
macroeconomic demand (and with it the scale of economic activities, employment, etc.). Demand 
comes from income, and it is China‟s role in the creation and acquisition of world income that defines 
its systematic impact on world development.2 
Is China a boon, or a curse, for the development of the Global South? Scholarly studies have 
provided essential building blocks, while seemingly fall short of constructing a systematic conception. 
They tend to approach the China impact as per the experience of yet another East Asian successful 
industrializing economy, following the footsteps of Japan, South Korea, and the like. A large number 





industrialization and the condition of labour in the developing world. The thesis of „China reinforcing 
Southern de-industrialization‟ dwells on verifying whether Chinese manufactures exports have been 
displacing exports from other developing countries in the world market, and/or whether China‟s 
imports of primary commodities have been inducing the export countries to specialize in the primary 
sector. The thesis of „China under-cutting Southern labour‟ dwells on verifying whether Chinese 
manufactures exports have been driving other developing countries to rely on „cheap labour‟ for the 
survival of their industries, and/or whether China‟s investment in other developing countries has been 
mainly pursuing „cheap labour‟. 
This paper seeks to critically appraise and reinterpret the existing studies. The appraisal is not 
so much a critique, in the sense that it is not purported to explicitly and formally test the theses (and 
hence it would not question the validity of the associated empirical findings). It is rather an attempt to 
appropriately position the studies in the systematic context. Conceptually, in the face of competitive 
pressure from Chinese exports (Chinese labour), whether or not displacing (under-cutting) will occur 
in a particular developing economy hinges on productivity. Productivity improvement depends on 
investment. Hence, the crucial question for judging the systematic impact is whether China tends to 
undermine, or enhance, the capacity of productive investment in the developing world. The 
consideration on productive investment should be seen as more fundamental than, or at least 
complementary to, that of market competition. 
Placing productive investment at the centre of the investigation into the systematic impact 
does have its empirical foundation. The Chinese economy is well-known of its production-orientation, 
with its rate of productive investment far exceeding the rest of the world. It is also imperative for 
China to promote productive investment in the broader world. As will be explained below in the paper, 
neoliberal globalization has been associated with the rising predominance of speculative finance that 
tends to crowd out productive investment (thereby hampering industrialization and worsening labour 
condition in the developing world). China has been resisting such systemic dynamics of the world 





rapid deepening of the integration of the Chinese economy into the world market. It appears that 
China constitutes a significant countervailing, instead of preserving, force vis-à-vis the prevailing 
systemic dynamics of the neoliberal world. It is, ultimately, in this sense, that the quest for systematic 
conceptions of the China impact is justified.3 
The paper is divided into five sections, of which this introduction is the first. Section two 
outlines the main attributes of China‟s international economic activities, which are the direct 
mechanisms mediating the interaction between China and world development. Section three critically 
reviews and reinterprets, in relation to the indicated attributes and drawing on a range of relevant 
studies, the theses of „China reinforcing Southern de-industrialization‟ and „China under-cutting 
Southern labour‟. Section four turns to delineate the systemic dynamics of the Chinese economy, vis- 
à-vis neoliberal globalization. This delineation serves to both substantiate the argument that China is 
inclined to promote productive investment in the broader world, and to address the counter-factual 
view that productive investment in the developing world could have been curtailed rather than 




2. Attributes of China’s International Economic Activities 
 
The interaction between China and the broader world economy is mediated by its international 
economic activities. Merchandise exports and outward direct investment have been the main 
immediate mechanisms through which China impacts world development. Between 2000 and 2018, 
China‟s world share of merchandise trade increased from 4% to 12%, making it the biggest trading 
 
economy in the world. In 2018, China‟s world share of merchandise trade exceeded that of the United 
States (11%) and Japan (4%). The contrast in exports is even starker. In the same year, China‟s world 
share of merchandise export was 13%, which exceeded the sum total of the United States (8%) and 
Japan (4%). From these measures, it seems as if the world‟s second biggest economy is more „open‟, 





Three characteristics of China‟s international trade are of note. 
 
• First, trade balance: China has always run trade surpluses since the early 1990s and of hefty 
magnitudes from the mid-2000s onward, as is shown in Figure 1 by the gap between the two 
curves that represent total exports and imports. This is true even in the period of continuous 
and rapid appreciation of its currency vis-à-vis its major trading partners, and of continuous 
and rapid rise of the wage rates. Between January 2000 and January 2017, China‟s nominal 
effective exchange rate appreciated by 32% while the real (consumer price index-based) 
effective exchange rate appreciated by 34%.4 In the same period, the real urban wage rate and 
the real wage rate for migrant workers on average increased by 10.7% and 9.7%, respectively, 
per annum (see Figure 6 below). 
• Second, growth: both merchandise exports and imports have registered rapid growth for 
decades. As can be computed from the data in Table 1, the average rate of nominal annual 
growth of exports and imports was 14% and 13%, respectively, in the period 1980-2000. The 
same growth rates basically remained in the subsequent period of 2000-2018. Consequently, 
trade surpluses amounted to US dollar 351 billion in 2018, equivalent to 2.6% of GDP in that 
year. 
• Third, composition of exports and imports: the share of manufactures in total exports 
increased from 50% in 1980 to 95% in 2018. In contrast, the share of manufactures in total 
imports increased much more modestly, from 65% to 67%. Exports under the category 
„machinery and transport equipment‟ have registered the fastest expansion. Their shares in 
total exports increased from 5% in 1980 to 49% in 2018. 
[Figure 1], [Table 1] 
 
China‟s trade with the rest of the developing world has grown especially fast. Between 2000 and 2017, 
the average nominal rate of growth in its total merchandise trade with developing economies 





12%. Moreover, whilst China has been running surpluses with developed economies, its trade with 
developing economies has been in most years in sizeable deficits. During this period, China also 
experienced continuous worsening of its international terms of trade, whereas the opposite was true 
for the developing world as a whole. Between 1998 and 2018, China‟s net barter terms of trade 
decreased by a magnitude of 24%. This stood in contrast to the modest decrease (3%) for developed 
economies, and the massive increase (53%) for all developing economies excluding China (Figure 2). 
[Figure 2] 
 
Similar to international trade, since the turn of the century, China‟s performance in foreign 
direct investment (FDI) has been spectacular. Between 2000 and 2018, China accounted for 25% of 
the increase in the total of FDI flows (inflows plus outflows) in the world, and 51% in the total of all 
developing economies. There is a complexity specifically for the data of (mainland) China‟s FDI 
flows, though: the high proportion of inflows from, and outflows to, the Hong Kong region. In 2018, 
the inflows from Hong Kong and the outflows to Hong Kong accounted for 67% of total inflows and 
61% of total outflows, respectively. It is not clear how much of these flows is „round-tripping‟ in 
nature, or true FDI using Hong Kong as an intermediate destination.5 Provided that the proportion of 
„round-tripping‟ flows do not fundamentally alter the picture, China remains as a major supplier and 
recipient of FDI in the world. And there are observably three important characteristics.6 
[Figure 3] 
 
• First, geographical distribution: the lion‟s share of China‟s outward FDI has flown to the 
developing world, although investment in developed economies has increased at a faster pace 
in recent years. In 2018, 71% of China‟s outward FDI flows went to developing and transition 
economies. By the end of that year, of the total stocks of China‟s outward FDI, 88% were in 
developing and transition economies.7 
• Second, sectoral distribution: China‟s outward FDI has concentrated in activities that appear 





finance, and information technology services, which combined to account for 67% of the 
stock of China‟s outward FDI by the end of 2018. Nevertheless, there was a degree of 
variation across different continents. The patterns in Asia and Latin America and Caribbean 
gear towards trade-related services, while that in Africa is comprises mainly of activities 
known as „building infrastructure in exchange for resources‟.8 
• Third, agents of investment: hitherto, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have played a more 
important role than non-SOEs in carrying out the investment. By the end of 2008, of the stock 
of outward FDI, 70% was accounted for by SOEs. The share decreased to 48% by the end of 
2018, while, at the same time, another 27% was accounted for by mixed-ownership 
shareholding companies. This change reflects partly the ownership reform of Chinese SOEs. 
It also reflects partly the division of labour between SOEs and non-SOEs: SOEs, typically of 
bigger sizes and less profit-oriented, and their activities being associated with state strategies 
and supports, tend to pave the way for the subsequent entry of non-SOEs. 
On the whole, as far as Chinese investment in the rest of the developing world is concerned, 
serving merchandise trade seems to have been the main consideration. Whether or not, or to what 
extent, this picture of the sectoral and geographical distribution of China‟s outward FDI could be 
altered by the peculiar role of Hong Kong needs further investigation. Insofar as the picture is not 
substantially altered, it is observed that the trading in question has been mainly an exchange of 














Relevant studies on China‟s impact on world development are diverse in terms of the scope of focus, 
the analytics, the empirical findings, and the concluding judgements. Nevertheless, discernibly, a 
large number of the studies have coalesced around two theses – namely, the thesis of „China 
reinforcing Southern de-industrialization‟ and that of „China under-cutting Southern labour‟. 
Studies pertaining to the first thesis typically ask two questions. First, have Chinese products 
displaced the manufactures by other developing economies in the markets? Second, have China‟s 
imports of primary commodities induced the export countries to exceedingly specialize in the primary 
sector?9 The studies have tended to give affirmative answers to the two questions. These include 
studies on the displacement effect on the manufacturing sectors in East Asia, Sub Saharan Africa, and 
Latin America.10 Across the world, the displacement effect from Chinese exports is found to be 
mainly evident in middle-income economies and much less so in low-income and high-income 
economies.11 Additionally, existing studies do find evidence of China trade inducing developing 
economies that export primary commodities to increasingly specialize in that sector.12 
Studies pertaining to the thesis of „China under-cutting Southern labour‟ typically approach 
the issue in two fronts.13 Concerning investment, case studies do find evidence that Chinese investors 
have treated employees unfavourably in terms of labour standards and compensations.14 Yet, case 
studies also find that Chinese investors are just as profit-oriented as investors from other countries, 
and hence their similar pursuit of the lowest possible labour cost.15 Further case studies reveal that 
employment relations within Chinese business establishments in developing countries vary across 
different circumstances, depending on local political-economic conditions.16 To systematically verify 
the „under-cutting‟ thesis requires ascertaining the effect of China on the broader conditions of labour 
employment in the developing countries in question. This entails falling back on the issue of 
displacement effect, together with conjecturing the importance of „cheap labour‟ in accounting for the 
competitiveness of China‟s manufactures exports. Concerned scholars argue that „cheap labour‟ has 
indeed been the main factor behind China‟s export competitiveness, and, through the pressure of 





to the bottom‟ in labour standards, where the bottom is allegedly defined by the conditions in China, 
has thus been at worked on the global scale.17 Empirically, it is possible to find evidence that the 
penetration of Chinese manufactures into the home markets of developing countries has indeed 
adversely affected the latter‟s labour employment.18 For this to be a substantiation of the „under- 




Contextualizing the Theses 
 
The two theses summarised above might well be partial in nature for studying China‟s systematic 
impact on world development. Conceptually, focusing on displacement is not necessarily sufficient to 
capture the full developmental effects arising from the opening up of bilateral trade or integration into 
multilateral trade. The theses can also be empirically partial, in the sense that they might have missed 
out some other channels through which China trade and investment impact the developing economies 
in question. This partial nature of the theses can be seen in the light of a range of studies that employ 
broader theoretical frameworks for analysing the China impact. 
In an exercise that is in the spirit of computable general equilibrium analysis, Adrian Wood 
and Jörg Mayer find that China‟s manufactures exports, by altering the global pattern of comparative 
advantage, do have the industry-displacing and primarization-inducing effects for many developing 
economies, although the magnitudes of the effects are small for the economies in question.19 In a 
different computable general equilibrium analysis of gains from trade arising from China‟s economic 
expansion, Julian di Giovanni et al. find that economies with comparative advantage similar to China, 
in labour-intensive production, tend to suffer from China‟s trade expansion. They also find that, in a 
dynamic setting with technological change, these countries benefit from China‟s trade expansion if 
China has faster productivity growth in sectors that it does not have comparative advantage.20 This 
way, compared to studies pertaining to the two afore-mentioned theses, both Wood and Mayer and di 





narrower in a different respect: the appropriateness of comparative advantage (and gains from trade) 
analysis for capturing the systematic impact of China might need to be ascertained in the first place. 
Christina Wolf analyses the China impact within a structuralist framework, which, again, is 
broader in scope but more specific in theory, compared to the two theses in question. Drawing on 
Post-Keynesian theories, Wolf highlights the importance – for the industrialization of relevant 
developing economies – of the easing of the constraints of balance of payments and development 
finance thanks to the China-induced improvement in international terms of trade. The China-invested 
infrastructure projects also seem to have contributed, via linkage effects, to domestic market 
formation that is conducive to industrialization.21 As for the direct impact on industrialization, 
consideration is needed for balancing the negative effect of displacing labour-intensive manufactures 
and the positive effect of the availability of cheap capital goods from China. The importance of capital 
goods from China is also emphasized by Daniel Poon, where it is submitted that, compared to capital 
goods from advanced countries, Chinese goods tend to embody a higher degree of appropriate 
technology for developing economies.22 
Dani Rodrik, and Jesus Felipe and Aashish Mehta, approach the systematic China impact on 
the basis of broader world-scale stylized facts, instead of broader theoretical frameworks.23 Central to 
their studies is the emphasis on the importance, and urgency, of industrialization in the developing 
world under globalization. Felipe and Mehta report that manufacturing‟s share in world income and 
employment has remained stable, but there has been relocation of industry on a gigantic scale to just a 
few developing economies. Rodrik further highlights the danger of premature de-industrialization for 
developing economies. It is on this basis that studies pertaining to the two theses on the China impact 
are justified, and the investigation into displacement effects is important. Even so, these theses need to 
be contextualized, in relation to industrialization on the world scale. Rodrik also, at various levels, 
note the importance of the further China effects over and above displacement – such as the dynamic 








The Theses in Relation to the Broader Empirical Picture 
 
Existing studies pertaining to the theses of „reinforcing de-industrialization‟ and „under-cutting labour‟ 
are mostly case studies of particular regions, countries, or industries. Qualifications and cautions are 
needed for drawing concluding judgements from their findings on China‟s systematic impact, in view 
of their narrowness in both theoretical frameworks and scopes of empirical investigations. 
Outside China, industrialization in the rest of the developing world since the turn of the 
century is not plainly a record of failure. The world share of manufactures exports from developing 
economies excluding China actually increased from 12.5% in 1999 to 15.3% in 2012, before falling 
back to 13.5% in 2017 (Figure 4). The same pattern is observable regarding the world shares of 
manufacturing value-added: all developing economies excluding China increased their share from 
12.9% in 1999 to 21.0% in 2012, before falling back to 19.3% in 2017 (Figure 5). Displacement 
effects in the absolute sense of directly suffocating industrialization in the rest of the developing 
world, though found to be presence in the case studies of various particular economies, do not seem to 
be true for characterizing the overall picture of the impact of China‟s export expansion. 
[Figure 4], [Figure 5] 
 
The increase in the world share of manufactures exports from the rest of the developing world 
has substantially lagged behind that from China, though. Between 1999 and 2017, China‟s share 
increased by 12.9 percentage points, whereas the rest of the developing world increased by just one 
percentage point. The contrast in the increased world shares of manufacturing value-added is similar: 
between 1999 and 2017, China had an increase by 21.3 percentage points, while the rest of the 
developing world increased by 6.9 percentage points. Perhaps, should there be no „China impact‟, the 





The performance of China vis-à-vis the rest of the developing world in manufacturing appears 
to be correlated with differences in productive investment. Between 2000 and 2017, China‟s world 
share of gross capital formation increased by 20.5 percentage points, while the rest of the developing 
world increased by 8.4 percentage points. The average ratio of gross capital formation to GDP, for the 
period 2000-2017, is 43.1% for China and 24.7% for all other developing economies combined (Table 
2). This correlation raises the question regarding the direction of causation between export and output 
performance, on the one hand, and productive investment, on the other hand. 
[Table 2] 
 
Two theoretical strands, on primarization in developing economies, are of insight for 
investigating into the nexus of de-industrialization and (lack of) productive investment. The theory of 
the Dutch Disease, focusing on issues of incentive, posits that the movements of relative prices 
(particularly the exchange rate) following a commodity boom tend to induce investment to shift away 
from industrialization. In contrast, the Dependency interpretation of the Prebisch-Singer thesis, on the 
deterioration of the terms of trade against primary commodities, focuses on capability. It posits that 
the deterioration tends to result in the outflows of the investible economic surplus of developing 
economies, thereby undermining their capability to industrialize. These views can be rephrased in the 
following way. First, industrialization requires investment utilizing available economic surplus. 
Second, de-industrialization can be caused either by lack of capability or lack of incentive to invest. 
Third, lack of capability due to surplus outflows is externally caused, while lack of incentive due to 
the „misuse‟ of surplus is internally caused. Neoclassical economics need not agree that de- 
industrialization is a „misuse‟ of resources, provided that it is in line with the principle of comparative 
advantage. Dependency theory, meanwhile, contends that the „domestic‟ can just be an outcome 
dictated by the prevailing dynamics of the world political-economic system. 
In view of the major attributes of China‟s international economic activities, detailed in the 





matches the discrepancy in gross capital formation indicated in Table 2 – from other developing 
economies to China. Also recall that, alongside the expansion of trading with China since the turn of 
the century, there has been a trend of improving terms of trade for the rest of the developing world. It 
is likely that lack of incentive, in the relevant developing economies, has blocked the utilization of 
incomes from the China-related commodity booms to invest in industrialization. 
The contrast in productive investment can also serve as counter-evidence to the thesis of 
 
„under-cutting labour‟. Recall the rapidly rising share, in China‟s total exports, of machinery and 
transport equipment, which can be reasonably classified as capital-intensive rather than labour- 
intensive. Recall also the fast expansion of China‟s exports, and the persistence of trade surpluses, 
amid the massive appreciation of the yuan. In addition, note that wage rise was rather rapid precisely 
during this period of China‟s rapid expansion in international trade and outward investment. Between 
2000 and 2018, the average annual growth of real wage rate was 10.4% for urban registered 
employees and 9.1% for migrant workers, both exceeding the 8.8% of the average annual growth of 
real per-worker GDP (Figure 6). To achieve the export expansion amid the currency appreciation and 
wage rise required sufficiently fast growth in labour productivity. And it is conceivable that this fast 
productivity growth was associated with the fast growth in productive investment. 
[Figure 6] 
 
All these said, the „under-cutting labour‟ thesis appears to be far less convincing than the 
alternative thesis that productive investment was the main driving force behind China‟s productivity 
growth, industrial upgrading, and, therefore, export competitiveness. Insofar as the rest of developing 
economies did find themselves compelled to cheapen labour with a view of withstanding competition 
by Chinese manufactures, this might have been mainly due to their insufficiency in productive 
investment. Prima facie, this discrepancy between China and the rest of the developing world in 









4. China vis-à-vis Globalization: Systemic Dynamics and Systematic Impact 
 
The thesis of „reinforcing Southern de-industrialization‟, and even more so that of „under-cutting 
Southern labour‟, rests on a particular perception of the prevailing model of economic development in 
China. This is a model of export-oriented, labour-intensive industrialization mainly based on „cheap 
labour‟. The relationship between such model and the displacement effects on other developing 
economies is self-explanatory: that China needs to rely on the expansion of labour-intensive 
manufactures exports for sustaining its economic growth and employment. The relationship with 
„under-cutting‟ is also conceivable: that the competitiveness of China‟s manufactures exports is said 
to have been sustained by „cheap labour‟, i.e., low wage rates, at least relative to productivity. 
The claim that Chinese exports have been mainly labour-intensive products, and the 
perception of „cheap labour‟ in China, are not consistent with the empirical evidence presented in 
Section two. The portrayed „China model‟ of economic development in general, as will be seen below, 
is far from accurate. But, irrespective of the accuracy of the claim, perception, and portrait, for the 
afore-mentioned relationships to hold, the role of China in world development needs to be of 
systematic significance – not just due to its size but, rather, due to its interaction with the prevailing 
systemic dynamics of neoliberal globalization. Clarifying such dynamics is thus needed for pinning 





A Sketch of the Systemic Dynamics of World Development under Globalization 
 
The systemic dynamics of wold development can be gauged by characterizing the core policy 
doctrines of globalization. The doctrines, known as the Washington Consensus, are neoliberal in 





liberalization, privatization of public assets and services, and financial liberalization especially 
concerning the de-regulation of cross-border capital flows. These policies combine to make economic 
resources increasingly financially tradable, and speculative finance becoming increasingly 
predominant in the economy. Since the early 1990s, a process of financialization has been central to 
the systemic dynamics of wold development. 
Theoretically, financialization, or capital being increasingly oriented to speculative activities, 
necessarily leads to crowding-out of productive, long-term investment. This crowding-out also tends 
to worsen income distribution between capital and labour, thereby depressing consumption growth. 
World development under globalization thus tends to encounter systematic demand deficiency. 
Moreover, the nature of speculative activities is such that they tend to focus on redistributing profits, 
not creating profits. Economic crises thus tend to first erupt in the financial sector, in the form of 
financial volatility or even financial collapse. The logic of financialization, in short, is to make itself 
intrinsically unsustainable.24 
In reality, financialization has actually been sustained for a prolonged period, up until the 
outbreak of systematic crises from 2008. The key to resolving this paradox is the concept of 
„accumulation by dispossession‟: capital accumulation under neoliberalism is mainly based on the 
absorption into the world market of productive resources that have been previously outside of it. In its 
formulation by David Harvey, the concept refers mainly to „predation, fraud, and thievery‟, through 
various forms of wealth- or profit-seizing speculative financial activities. Harvey also refers the 
concept to the expansion of the working class, by means of incorporating workers in the developing 
world into the system.25 This second point implies capital chasing „cheap labour‟ around the world. A 
process of the „race to the bottom‟ could then arise if, via neoliberalization, labour supply expands 






Harvey in his exposition on „accumulation by dispossession‟ seems to emphasize predatory 
activities while downplaying labour absorption. This treatment does have its reasons. Theoretically, in 
the context of financialization, capital in general is inclined to pursuing profits via speculation more 
than production. If possible at all, capital tends to dissociate itself from particular input-output 
configurations in particular locations. Insofar as production is necessary, avoiding large-scale sunk 
investment and pushing to the maximum degree of the substitution of labour for capital, are logical of 
this inclination. Empirically, there is evidence that the political-economic establishments of today‟s 
world have been in a significant measure dominated by the so-called Wall Street-Treasury-IMF 
Complex. Predatory activities by speculative finance were quite evident in the series of developmental 
crises under globalization.26 
All these said about predatory activities, it can be argued that labour absorption is no less 
important for „accumulation by dispossession‟. The IMF estimates that, in the period 1980-2005, the 
number of workers effectively producing for the world market quadrupled, and that increase mostly 
came from developing economies.27 Such a rapid pace of labour absorption has most likely created a 
situation that can be dubbed „the Lewis Model on the world scale‟: a situation of unlimited supply of 
labour from the South for employment by capital from the North. This being the case, the ramification 
for world development could be very problematic. In times of expanding labour absorption, the 
unequal power between capital and labour entails surplus transfer from the South to the North. This, 
in turn, implies a tendency to induce the developing economies involved to fall into a „low technology, 
low wage‟ trap. In times of crises, the relevant developing economies tend to bear the brunt of the 
systematic shocks arising from demand deficiency. In this context, some developing economies could 
still benefit from the labour absorption, if they manage to raise their labour productivity fast enough to 
more than compensate for the surplus outflows. But this must be exception, rather than the norm, in 
the face of the crowding-out of productive investment and the tendency of the „race to the bottom‟. 
The characterization above, to be sure, is no less theory-specific than the neoclassical general 





referenced in Section three for contextualizing the two theses under review. Yet, insofar as the 
characterization does have elements of truth, its focus on capturing the systemic dynamics of world 




The ‘China Model’ beyond Export-oriented, Labour-intensive Industrialization 
 
Has China‟s economic expansion been reinforcing, or undermining, the systemic dynamics of world 
development characterized above? To answer this question requires dissecting the interaction between 
China and world development, as well as the direction of its domestic economic transformation. It is 
necessary to verify whether export-oriented, labour-intensive industrialization has been the mainstay 
of the „China model‟ of economic development since the turn of the century. Available evidence 
suggests that it is not. 
Consider labour absorption. Incorporating Chinese labour into the world market has been 
crucial for the formation of „the Lewis Model on the world scale‟. Recall the IMF estimate that the 
effective labour force of the world market quadrupled between 1980 and 2005. This estimate is 
constructed by summing over the national data of total labour forces adjusted by their export-to-GDP 
ratios. Using a simpler, aggregate measure of the same indicator, the number of workers effectively 
producing for the world market in 2005 is founded to be 2.28 times of that in 1980, whilst the estimate 
for all developing countries is 3.79 times and that for China alone is 8.65 times. The world share of 
the number of Chinese workers producing for the world market increased from 8% in 1980 to 32% in 
2005.28 
Along with labour absorption are the drawbacks as suggested by the characterization above of 
the dynamics of world development. The renowned „Foxconn Model‟, a model of manufacturing 
sweatshops controlled by transnational capital, has often been cited as representative of the Chinese 





high work intensity and low wage rates at the micro level, and under-consumption at the macro level. 
The result is surplus outflows in times of expansion, and excess capacity in crisis-ridden times.29 
Is the „Foxconn Model‟ representative of the Chinese economy? It might be representative 
only of the sector of processing trade, i.e., manufacturing activities that import parts and components, 
assemble into finished products, and re-export to the world market. Exports under the category of 
processing trade had accounted for approximately half of the annual value of China‟s total 
merchandise exports from the mid-1990s until 2010, before turning to continuous decline to gradually 
reach 34% in 2016. Measured as the ratio of net to gross exports, the ratio of domestic value-added of 
processing trade steadily increased from around 20% in the mid-1990s to reach the peak level of 45% 
by 2009. The value-added so calculated for 2009 was equivalent to no more than 5% of China‟s GDP. 
Processing trade is thus no more than an enclave sector of the Chinese economy.30 
The mainstay of Chinese economic development since the late 1990s has been far more than a 
process of labour-intensive, export-oriented industrialization. Recall the analysis of China‟s trade 
performance in Section two, and the critique of the thesis of under-cutting in Section three. The rising 
share of machinery and transport equipment in total exports, the persistence of trade surpluses amid 
rapid currency appreciation, the continuous wage rise, and, most fundamentally, the fast productivity 
growth, all indicating that „cheap labour‟ can hardly be a significant underpinning of China‟s export 
and economic growth. Sustained rapid growth in productive investment, in defiance of the broader 
context of financialization, is far more important. 
It has been suggested elsewhere that, since the late 1990s, Chinese economic development has 
exhibited a tendency of converging to what can be termed the „Golden Age Model‟, i.e., the economic 
model that prevailed in advanced capitalist economies in the era 1950-1975. Characteristic of the 
model is synchronous growth in labour productivity and the wage rate, which, in turn, underpins 
synchronous growth in investment and consumption. It is with this tendency that China has been able 





world on a gigantic scale. This import appetite, together with the inclination to depress export prices 
by the sector of the „Foxconn Model‟, explains the spectacular trend of deterioration of China‟s terms 
of trade with the rest of the developing world.31 
Now, consider issues of predation. In the first decade of the Twenty-first Century, there was a 
notable trend in the world of finance: massive increases in the official holding of reserves in foreign 
exchange by developing economies. Measured as a ratio to their monthly-average import values, the 
official holdings by developing economies increased from 5.2 months in 2000 year-end to 10.6 
months in 2014 year-end. The ratio for China alone increased from 7.9 to 20.8 months. In contrast, the 
ratio for developed economies increased only slightly, from 2.4 to 3.2 months.32 In the face of 
increasing financialization of the world economy, developing economies had to accumulate reserves 
for protecting their currencies against speculative runs. Given the low rates of returns to the reserves, 
the accumulation entails paying seigniorage to the reserves currencies-issuing countries – a tributary 
transfer of economic surplus to the financial hegemons of the world. 
The situation with China could be considered as the extreme of this outward surplus transfer. 
 
In addition to facing the general pressure of global financialization, China has had to confront 
conundrums arising from what Ronald McKinnon and Gunther Schnabl term „currency 
mismatches‟.33 Whilst being the biggest trading economy in the world, with the biggest trade surplus, 
China‟s currency is not sufficiently important in the international monetary system for financing the 
surplus. It thus had to accumulate reserves in the period 2000-2014. Worse, pressed by its trading 
partners for reducing trade surplus, it had to allow its currency to continuously appreciate after 2005, 
and this invited massive inflows of „hot money‟ only to further increase official reserves. 
Things seem to have worsened after 2008. Amid the unfolding Great Recession worldwide, 
predatory activities via hegemony in the international monetary system have become all the more 
reckless. It is reported that the series of Quantitative Easing in developed economies resulted in the 





bubbles.34 The reverse flows after 2014, again with leveraged effects, resulted in bursting of the 
bubbles. These inflows and outflows of „hot money‟, manipulated by the financial hegemons of the 
world, have been exceedingly harmful to developing economies. China, for one, has suffered from the 
associated booms and busts with its asset markets. Its loss of foreign exchange in 2015 due to capital 
outflows, for instance, is estimated to exceed 600 billion US dollar.35 The severe fluctuations in its 
stock market in 2015, and with it fluctuations in its exchange rate, were to a significant measure 
related to these inflows and outflows of „hot money‟. 
In the attempt to cope with „currency mismatches‟, after 2008, China speeded up the process 
of the internationalization of its currency, the Renminbi yuan, and one set of policies being taken 
centre on opening up the domestic financial market. Yet, these policies have proved to be problematic. 
The massive inflows and outflows of „hot money‟ have caused booms and busts in the domestic asset 
markets. Worse, they have also caused serious crowding-out effects on productive investment, forcing 
Chinese industrial firms to become increasingly speculation-oriented. The likely outcome of  
promoting yuan internationalization under the existing international monetary system is, at best, to 
financialize the Chinese economy with a hope of sharing the hegemony, i.e., to transform itself into 
purely a part of neoliberal globalization. The more likely outcome, however, is to fall prey to the 
existing financial hegemons of the world. 
In summary, hitherto, China has been partly submissive to the prevailing systemic dynamics 
of world development, in the form of the „Foxconn Model‟ in production and falling prey to 
international speculative interests in finance. It has also been partly resistant to the dynamics, in the 
form of the domestic structural-institutional arrangements that have generated the tendency of 
converging to the „Golden Age Model‟. In recent years, the Chinese leadership has initiated a range of 
international programmes – the „Belt and Road Initiative‟ programme, the Asian Infrastructural 
Investment Bank, the New Development Bank, etc. – aimed at reshaping the economic landscapes of 
the world. One objective of the programmes is to promote yuan internationalization in a way that 





oriented financial hegemons of the world. The success or failure of this pursuit of an alternative to the 
prevailing systemic dynamics of world development will be of fundamental importance, not only for 






China‟s economic expansion over the past two decades has been of world-scale importance. This has 
induced enormous scholarly efforts to clarify its dynamics and ramifications. This paper seeks to 
contribute to the literature by means of attempting a delineation of the systemic dynamics of China, 
and of neoliberal globalization. The objective is to construct an appropriate conception of the 
systematic impact of China on world development. 
Many existing studies have coalesced around the theses of „China reinforcing Southern de- 
industrialization‟ and „China under-cutting Southern labour‟, with ample supportive evidence. Yet, 
the theses themselves cannot be said to be sufficient for assessing the systematic impact of China on 
world development. They need to be contextualized, both theoretically within broader frameworks 
that take into account of further effects that might have been brought about by China, and empirically 
in terms of the overall picture of the actual process of world development. 
For the thesis of „reinforcing de-industrialization‟, this paper argues that it is deficient at the 
systematic level. The rest of the developing world has had considerable expansion in manufacturing 
production and export, precisely in the period that China became a world-significant player in 
international trade and investment. For the thesis of „under-cutting labour‟, which largely hinges on 
the perception of a China-created „race to the bottom‟, this paper argues that it is wrong because 
China‟s trade expansion has been sustained by productivity growth rather than „cheap labour‟. In both 
instances, the contrast in production and trade performance is instead attributed to the difference 





Further discussion on the broader picture of world development suggests that its systemic 
dynamics has been dominated by a process of „accumulation by dispossession‟. This takes the forms 
of financial predation and labour absorption, leading to under-investment across the world. China‟s 
political economy has hitherto been mainly production-oriented in nature. This nature, by promoting 
productive investment both domestically and in the broader world, has served as a countervailing 
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Table 1. Composition of Exports and Imports (US$ billion) 
 
 
 1980 1990 2000 2018 2018/1980 
Exports      
Total merchandise 18 62 249 2487 137 
Manufactures 9 46 224 2352 261 
Machinery and transport equipment 1 6 83 1208 1433 
Imports      
Total merchandise 20 53 225 2135 107 
Manufactures 13 44 178 1434 110 
Machinery and transport equipment 5 17 92 840 164 
Exports/Imports ratio      
Total merchandise 0.91 1.16 1.11 1.16  
Manufactures 0.69 1.06 1.25 1.64  
Machinery and transport equipment 0.16 0.33 0.90 1.44  




























Sources: World Bank World Development Indicators, accessed 2nd December 2019. 
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Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook, various issues; and World Bank World Development 
Indicators, accessed 2nd December 2019. 
Note: Data of “Emerging and Developing Economies (Excluding China)” are estimates, assuming 
that they are weighted averages of the terms of trade of China and the rest of the developing 
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Sources: China Statistical Yearbook and Report on Development of China’s Outward Investment and 































































































































Sources: World Bank World Development Indicators, accessed 10th September 2019. 
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Table 2. Gross Capital Formation and Manufacturing Value-added (average % of GDP) 
 
 
 1970-1979 1980-1999 2000-2017 
Gross capital formation (% of GDP)    
China 34.0% 37.2% 43.1% 
Low & middle income - China 26.6% 24.8% 24.7% 
    
Manufacturing value added (% of GDP)    
China 36.8% 34.2% 31.3% 
Low & middle income - China 17.9% 18.0% 15.6% 



























Sources: Per-worker real GDP and urban wage rate data from China Statistical Yearbook, various 
issues; wage rate data for migrant workers from Report on Monitoring and Surveying Migrant 
Workers, various issues, and Lu Feng (2012) “Wage rate trends of China‟s migrant workers, 
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